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JOINT VISION 2010 COMMAND AND CONTROL: A CASE FOR STANDING JOINT TASK FORCES AND PURPLE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Future use of military force in pursuit of national objectives will be conducted mostly by joint forces. Joint Task Forces (JTFs) provide the regional CINCs the means to execute military operations ranging from humanitarian assistance to a major theater of war. Unfortunately, the overall performance of JTFs are compromised by poor joint command and control. Improved joint command and control is attainable only through greater unity of effort and unity of command. In order to respond to these challenges the military needs to re-evaluate how to best form up a JTF and the optimal way to deploy them.

The establishment of Standing Joint Task Forces (SJTFs) at each of the geographic CINC's headquarters is the first step in resolving these issues. Members of the SJTF work full-time for the JTF commander, whether at the headquarters or forward deployed. Their daily interactions foster greater efficiency, resulting in enhanced unity of effort. The second step entails embarking the SJTF aboard a deploying aircraft carrier. The co-location of commanders and staff breaks down service and functional stovepipes and provides greater unity of command, resulting in a more operationally effective JTF commander.

Since Service parochialism tends to impede joint initiatives, this solution requires a top-down commitment to the guidance articulated in Joint Vision 2010 in order to be successful.

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> We will discover new ways to change the development process for joint doctrine. Thus, we must integrate 'top-down' doctrine throughout the development cycle, while continuing to ensure that joint doctrine fully incorporates the strengths that each Service brings to joint warfare.[1]

I. Dateline 2010

Commander Joint Expeditionary Forces (CJEF), operates with his staff and components forward deployed. Due to the continued decline of host nation base rights agreements and frequent disappointments in forming coalitions in areas of regional instability, the CJEF and his component commanders, under operational control of the CINC, are embarked in deploying Joint Command Ships (JCC) and Joint Aircraft Carriers (CVJ). Only rarely are they able to command from shore. Since Fleet Exercise Charlie in 2005, when all JTF components got underway for two months, all the Services have appreciated the value of afloat joint command and control. The entire JEF is deployable and provides the CINC with continuous coverage in the Pacific, Persian Gulf, and Mediterranean Sea. These joint deployments took some doing, but now Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines deploy together, projecting expeditionary force into the littorals. Some felt these platforms, carrying the majority of the JEF staff, were vulnerable high value units, just waiting to be engaged by a concentrated enemy attack against this central node. However, the network-centric evolution of joint command and control makes it possible for the JEF's geographically dispersed units to quickly reposition and employ concentrated mass. By commanding from the sea, the JEF commander gains full dimensional protection, precision engagement, dominant maneuver, focused logistics, unity of command, and unity of effort throughout the enlarged battlespace.

> How can we presume to lead, train, or coordinate with other nations when we cannot agree on something as fundamental as command and control.[2]

II. Introduction

In 1986 a determined Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act, mandating "jointness" in the military by *inter alia* creating regional Commanders in Chief (CINCs). The Act empowered four-star Flag and General Officers at the theater strategic level with operational control of all armed forces in their areas of responsibility. Unfortunately, joint command and control failed to completely develop from strategic direction to operational execution. One glaring shortcoming is the continued reliance on *ad hoc* (including augmented) instead of standing Joint Task Forces (JTFs). *Ad hoc* and augmented JTF staffs cause degraded unity of command and effort for the Joint Force Commander (JFC), which compromises the operational effectiveness of the JTF.

The objective of this paper is not resolution of all current inter-Service debates over joint command and control. This subject area is overflowing with numerous diverse, parochial, contradictory opinions. Instead, this paper takes a more holistic approach. It recommends leapfrogging over the many current joint doctrinal debates and refocusing on the impediments, initiatives, and options to implement joint command and control as envisioned in JV 2010. The thesis is that JTFs will be unable to improve unity of command and effort, thus failing to meet joint command and control challenges articulated in JV 2010, unless two steps are taken: (1) standing JTF headquarters (SJTFs) are established for each regional CINC; (2) portions of these SJTFs routinely deploy to theaters of operations, embarked in joint command and control platforms -- a joint configured CVX (the next generation carrier),

reclassified as a CVJ ("J" for joint) being one practical employment option. This type of solution requires a top down approach,[3] much like the implementation of the successful Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) -- "maintain the people, maintain the capability."[4] This course of action obligates the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to enforce both reduction in service parochialism and greater compliance with JV 2010.

III. Future Operational Environment and the JTF

Any decision on how to optimally form up and deploy JTFs requires an assessment of the future security environment. One common assumption is that future threats will offer significantly less reaction time. Friendly forces will rely more heavily on forces in theater during the decisive early days of a crisis or conflict. This come-as-you-are battlespace, compounded by trends of decreased availability of base and overflight rights,[5] will mean operations that are increasingly expeditionary in nature. Many of these will be joint because, "...it is unlikely that the U.S. naval expeditionary forces will undertake unilateral operations in the future in the mid- to high-intensity level of war."[6] Expeditionary forces must therefore have joint configured command and control architectures that enable the rapid and seamless integration of follow-on forces and their commanders. In order to execute this tasking, the JTF Commander requires a highly trained, professional, standing joint staff, which is well versed in missions along the spectrum of conflict from humanitarian operations to major theater wars. It is undeniable that, "...well trained joint staffs are as critical to operations as well trained forces provided by the services."[7] There will be insufficient time to throw together a proficient *ad hoc* staff.

It will also be imperative that the SJTF be able to command from a highly maneuverable, on-scene, robust, command and control platform, one configured to support joint operations. The next generation aircraft carrier, CVX (operational by 2010), offers an ideal platform from which joint expeditionary staffs and forces might operate. If designated as a joint asset, CVJ, this incredibly capable carrier, could provide the CJTF with the flexibility to safely and effectively command all his forces from the littorals to hundreds of miles at sea. In its function as the central node in the JTF, it will command the force while also fulfilling historic missions of sea control and power projection.

IV. Service Impediments to Joint Command and Control

The preceding pages dealt with what the equivalent of a joint doctrinal end state. If getting there really requires a "leap of faith" (a leapfrog over the current joint debates), a brief assessment of Service impediments to change is necessary. It is not surprising that while each Service pays tribute to the benefits of jointness, it comes up short in implementation. Ironically, it is the Services themselves that stand to gain the most.[8] As Admiral Owens outline in his "System of Systems,"

> In short, the system of systems is fundamentally a joint military entity. No single service can build it alone - only coordinated interactions of all the services can produce it. When it is fully constructed, each of the services will be far stronger.[9]

The Navy openly admits its reluctance to endorse concepts that may encroach on its historically unique mission. Contrast, for example, the redundant following quotes. In one recent article the CNO stressed,

> The real challenge is in changing our way of thinking...We will combine the ideas of 2010 with the revolutionary naval thinking

> contained in *Forward From the Sea* to <u>*optimize the unique impact*</u> of sea-based forces.[10] (emphasis added)

A subsequent coordinated Navy-Marine Corps message made a subtle but significant distinction. This message, which discontinued use of the Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF) concept,[11] highlights the struggle between parochialism and jointness:

> As we move beyond the utility of a NETF construct, we must continue to work together to develop useful forward thinking doctrine that embraces joint operations while <u>*preserving the uniqueness*</u> of the Navy and Marine Corps team.[12] (emphasis added)

While NETF might not have been the best answer to CVBG/ARG/MEU(SOC) command and control issues, dismissals (by either the Navy or Marine Corps) based in large part on preserving Service prerogatives are equally flawed. Service uniqueness is not compromised because of the color of the commander in charge's uniform. After all, Service uniqueness is, by its very nature, inviolable. Whereas today, uniqueness is preserved by virtue of force structure, personalities, and historical mission, tomorrow uniqueness will be preserved by compromise and joint efficiencies. It is also irrelevant whether the JTF is formed along Service or functional lines.[13] It is a matter of assigning the best force to the right mission. No CINC or CJTF questions the unique contributing role of each service. Their impartial responsibility is to "apply the right force, at the right place, at the right time."[14]

Army and Air Force movement toward greater jointness is similarly hampered by service parochialism. Like the Navy-Marine Corps team, unresolved points of contention abound between the two services. The issue of air defense missions is a case in point. Corps commanders maintain OPCON over organic assets. However, the Area Air Defense

Commander (AADC), as the supported commander, controls echelon above-corps (EAC) assets and assigns all air defenses. This means the Land Component Commander (LCC) can only make requests to the AADC, and then, "...trust AADCs to make the correct decision."[15]

The same inbred distrust permeates the relationship among all the services. Perhaps the most interesting part of Generals Reimer and Fogelman's article is that its title reads more as an oxymoron -- "Joint Warfare and the Army-Air Force Team" -- than a call for greater jointness among the services. The two service chief authors go one step further by praising their respective services' rapprochement as positive efforts toward, "...ensuring the Army and Air Force remain the premier air-land team."[16] This statement certainly does not sound like a call for expanding joint interactions with the Navy and Marine Corps. It seems the services need to be reminded that, "joint doctrine...must transcend individual perspectives and provide an overarching approach to warfare that integrates all individual service contributions."[17]

V. Initiatives in Joint Command and Control

As the previous paragraphs suggest, the espoused "leap of faith" will be across a chasm deep and wide. Nevertheless, one service in particular stands out for an initiative to build greater jointness in command and control, and solve the problem of the *ad hoc* nature of JTF staffs. The Marine Corps' establishment of a Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters at Camp Lejeune is a unique initiative. In 1995, the Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG) outlined the concept:

> The Marine Corps must provide a fully capable, expeditionary, Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters organized and equipped to move out on a moment's notice to meet the uncertainties of a chaotic new world. In concept, this would be the headquarters of choice when the National

> Command Authorities and the Unified Commanders in Chief are planning to respond to emerging crises anywhere in the world's littorals.[18]

Some might misinterpret the motives behind this and other Marine Corps decisions as part of a grander scheme to free the Corps from Navy clutches.[19] However, at least in this case, the benefits are predominately for the CINC and the CJTF. While the initial SJTF start-up fees are sizable, it more than pays for itself in the long run. Most importantly, it substantiates the true benefits of a standing joint task force headquarters, some of which are:

1. Best JSO training, constantly working JTF issues makes resident experts.
2. Allows time for development of personal relationships among the members.
3. Continuity allows effective incorporation of lessons learned.
4. Highly mobile and responsive to all theaters.
5. Proficient TPFDD managers; "they bring just what is needed, not everything."[20]

Today, the SJTF is fighting not only for legitimacy but also survival. It is endangered because the Marine Corps perhaps dismissed Admiral Owens' warning that all the services must participate to build the system of systems. Marines dared to "build it alone," their "*Field of Dreams.*" Unfortunately, in this case, "it was built, but they (the other services) did not come."[21] Ultimately, this concept will probably fail; not because it is the wrong thing to do, or because of fiscal constraints, or lack of equipment, or missions, or even manpower. It will fail because when it comes to jointness, and joint command and control, change cannot bubble up from a Service. Joint doctrine changes must be promulgated top down to be successful.[22]

VI. Forming a JTF

JTFs are a growth industry. At one time EUCOM reported standing up JTFs at the frequency of one every six weeks.[23] Increased JTF use across the full spectrum of conflict

places hardships on a CINC's staff, which attempts to support these forces because of the absence of a dedicated standing JTF staff. Faced with this situation, and without overarching guidance from above, CINCs have independently developed guidance for creating JTFs in their areas of responsibility. Without the authority or resources to form standing JTFs, the CINCs have little choice but to accept *ad hoc* JTFs. Nevertheless, they looked for ways to overcome the inherent deficiencies of *ad hoc* staffs. The most successful solution was the augmented staff, a type of hybrid *ad hoc* JTF staff. The specific of each CINC's program differs slightly, but in general these CINC JTF staffs consist of a core and plugs.[24] The core members are resident experts on the CINC's staff who, in time of crisis, can rapidly stand up the JTF. This core is reinforced by augments from other commands, until an entire staff is formed. The plugs are the follow on forces who report to the headquarters or, if the JTF is already moving, join up (plug-in) enroute or in theater. In addition, there is annual training for the core and augments, as well as exercises for the whole staff. Despite optimism, these staffs still suffer from the handicaps of their *ad hoc* orientation. Their list of liabilities includes:

1. Unfamiliarity between JTF staff members.
2. Insufficient training time for JTF staff members.
3. JTF staff duty is only a collateral duty.
4. Too few subject matter experts on staff (i.e., wide quality spread).
5. Not responsive to short notice availability requirements.
6. Staff too small to support frequency, spectrum, and complexity of missions.[25]

While JTFs have managed to carry out their missions somewhat satisfactorily throughout the past decade, they accomplished missions without codified doctrine and only largely because of personalities and personal relationships. They did it through perseverance.

However, it will not be long before the growing demands of CINCs and JTF commanders outpace the inherent weaknesses of *ad hoc* staffs.

Another interesting feature of the present system is that although a JFC has the authority to, "organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations,"[26] until appointed as the JTF commander, the time for interaction with the CINC's JTF staff is limited. The JFC's ability to improve staff unity of effort, which is necessary for "effectiveness and efficiency" in a sound command organization,[27] is likewise compromised. These same shortcomings negatively impact unity of command. According to General Krulak:

> Unity of command has nothing to do with the number of commanders in a specific medium but everything to do with the relationship between a commander and his subordinates.[28]

While his definition is accurate, it also highlights the excessive influence of personal relationships. The immense value of experts like liaison officers, while praised as a positive attribute,[29] also indicates manning problems in the present system. Unity of command on a JTF staff needs to come from working together, not because of previously having worked together. The bottom line is the JFC personally intervenes in selecting members of his JTF because the system allows it. It is the way the system makes up for its inability to provide a fully competent, joint qualified, and trustworthy JTF staff.

Interestingly, the search for solutions reveals parallels in both the civilian workplace and international forums. In the civilian workplace is the example of interagency working groups and coordinating bodies that met during the previous Presidential Administration, even when there was no crisis at hand. These regular meetings, "...proved to be valuable and

created the sorts of positive dynamics that facilitate responsive crisis management."[30] A similar example exists in the international environment. Consider the following paragraph about the differences between coalitions and alliances, and note the similarities between coalitions and *ad hoc* JTFs (emphasis added):

> Unlike alliances, the members of coalitions may have little experience working together [*staff members*], and coalitions can include nations [*certain individuals*] normally less friendly. So, successful coalition operations face some hurdles that long-standing alliances mitigate [*OPLAN familiarity, crisis and deliberate action planning*]. They sometimes overcome considerable distrust among their members [*inter-service rivalry*], and they do not necessarily start from any common understanding of rules of engagement or operational familiarity [*not JSO qualified*]. The military capabilities of coalition members can differ greatly [*individual level of knowledge*] and those differences can complicate and hinder effective coordination [*staff cooperation*] when military force has to be used [*making decisions*].[31]

This annotated quote shows how CINCs, despite their level of authority, face the same problems of non-meeting interagency groups and coalitions by having to rely on *ad hoc* JTFs in response to crisis and deliberate planning. Clearly, alliances are more effective and efficient than coalitions, as are interagency working groups that hold regular meetings, as are standing joint task forces.

The litmus test for the successful establishment of an optimal standing JTF staff includes addressing each of the arguments raised against it. They include:

1. CINC cannot support manning requirements.
2. CINC staff might delegate too much to JTF staff.
3. There is a vast scope of area.
4. Broad range of potential missions.
5. Excessive overhead costs.
6. Number of standing JTFs required is prohibitive.[32]

Each of these six objections has merit but is refutable. First, the CINC and his service commanders clearly are not able to lend people to form up a new staff at the CINC headquarters. If they could, they probably would have set up standing JTFs years ago. However, the Services themselves can. It is all a matter of priorities. If the Marine Corps, the smallest of the services by far, can dedicate 110 Marines to their Service's standing joint task force, then it seems fair to say that the other services could provide similar proportions in terms of endstrength percentage. In this case, the total number of personnel available Service-wide would equal 1,400 officers (Army = 491, Navy = 343, Air Force = 456, and Marine Corps = 110), or 280 officers per geographic CINC.[33] These personnel are distributed to the CINCs commensurate with their skill groups, the command's joint missions essential task list (JMETL), and their historical frequency of participation in JTFs. This would be more of a dynamic than a static number. Second, the issue of conflict between the staffs is unnecessary to even list. To clear up any ambiguity, each group of individuals needs a clearly stated set of duties and responsibilities to minimize conflicts. This is an internal matter. Third, the scope of responsibility depends on the AOR. CINCS with larger AORs would receive a larger number of personnel to support their greater responsibility. Fourth, considering the range of missions, the same determinants to the third point are evaluated here. A staff can cover all missions in the AOR without being ridiculously large by either segmenting the spectrum of conflict[34] or dividing the AOR into regions. Either way, this requires staff specialization. Fifth, the overhead costs are mostly absorbed during start-up. The Marine Corps standing task force learned that while the initial costs of high speed computers, a local area network, a SIPRNET, and communications packages are high, they

amortize through efficient application of forces. Once again, information flow helps determine what is needed, rather than bringing everything. Finally, the number of required SJTFs can be reasonable if not structured as they are today. The exact number of SJTFs and the size of their staffs will vary by each CINC's unique needs, but the total number does not exceed the manning threshold listed above.[35]

Technological advancements also play a crucial role in mitigating most SJTF manning concerns. Because of initiatives like Admiral Clemins' Information (IT)-21:

> The 2010 JFC will capitalize on networked systems and information infrastructures. If staffing processes can be performed by remote and networked capabilities, then commanders may be able to control more force with a smaller immediate staff, resulting in increased mobility.[36]

The push and pull between deployed and stay-behind headquarters staffs, along with tie-ins to governmental agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and academic experts, will allow "virtual staffs"[37] to further reduce the number of required billets. A smaller, better informed staff translates into a more responsive and effective operational commander.

VII. Floating the JTF and JV 2010

The military trend towards expeditionary warfare[38] necessitates reappraisal of the optimum location for the JTF commander's headquarters. Doctrine offers little guidance in this area. Joint pubs do not delineate a process for the commander to use to, "evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of the headquartering plan."[39] Several historical examples, recent real world events, exercises, and operational art terms support the thesis that the sea is an ideal medium from which to command a JTF.

There may be times when command from the sea is the only option. For example, even though JTFs did not exist by name, General MacArthur commanded from the sea both at Leyte Gulf and Inchon when the operational situation and geography made no other method feasible. More recently, the JTF commanders for OPERATION URGENT FURY (CJTF 120) in Grenada and OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (CJTF 180) in Haiti, commanded from afloat platforms. Exercises are also increasingly focused on joint/combined operations. RIMPAC '96, a combined operations exercise, confirmed the unique advantages of an afloat command ship in a complex operational environment.[40] The Navy's oldest command and control ship, USS CORONADO, supported operations from MOOTW to regional contingency, and disaster relief to multi-carrier operations.[41] However, platform age does impose restrictions. The Air Force is correct to point out that, "an afloat JTF headquarters may have limitations of space and equipment on certain flag ships, which could affect manning levels and equipment capabilities."[42] The Navy's inventory of four command and control ships[43] is not capable of supporting a complete JTF headquarters. In today's ships, the "CJTF's core staff, the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), the Area Air Defense Coordinator (AADC), and at least one other commander...can be fully supported," with other components possibly represented through liaison officers.[44] However, the answer lies just over the horizon with the Navy's next generation aircraft carrier.

By 2010, the Navy's next generation aircraft carrier (CVX) could be the ideal JTF headquarters. If CVX is redesignated as CVJ and designed from the keel up as a joint asset, it could provide a complete, unmatched joint headquarters suite for the JTF commander and all his component commanders. In comparison to today's command and control ships this

means increased sustainment, firepower, self defense, logistic support, and command and control. In operational art terms, CVJ as a command and control platform embodies JV-2010's four operational functions: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, focused logistics,[45] as well as enhanced unity of command and unity of effort.

"Dominant Maneuver will require forces that are adept at conducting sustained and synchronized operations from dispersed locations."[46] The aircraft carrier is the epitome of a sustainable asset. Whether CVX (CVJ) is nuclear powered or a new alternative propulsion source such as magnetic, it will have the same self-sufficiency enjoyed by today's Nimitz class carriers. In addition, with an even greater communications suite it will support the diverse command and control needs of the entire JTF staff. It will relay a common operational picture of the battlespace to the commander and component commanders in real time, brilliant imagery. The synchronization of forces is achieved by this "multi-faceted, high technology nucleus about which the powerful joint and coalition forces of 2010 will coalesce."[47]

JV 2010 states, "Even from extended ranges, precision engagement will allow us to shape the battlefield, enhancing the protection of our forces."[48] If the JTF commander is to effectively shape the battlefield, forces need to be in theater even before the crisis begins. This boils down to forward presence -- a Naval hallmark. Situations such as "crises, where every second counts and staffs must start out on a dead run,"[49] are eliminated because the JTF deploys with the carrier and is in an optimum position to respond quickly to rapidly unfolding events. Similarly, the JTF Commander is with his forces from the outset, rather

than in a scenario where he may, "find himself in command of a force that is already moving."[50]

"Full-Dimensional Protection will enable the effective employment of our forces while degrading opportunities for our enemy."[51] Whether protected by escorts or operating far outside the enemy's threat arcs, the aircraft carrier provides the safest headquarters for the JTF. Its freedom of movement, "defeats the enemy's attempts to gain a positional advantage to attack and attempt to decapitate the JTF" [52] and eliminates the immediate vulnerability of "permanent, in-garrison facilities."[53] The decision of when or if to transfer certain component commanders ashore becomes a much lower risk, situation-dependent event.

Focused Logistics includes the delivery of, "tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations."[54] Although not normally characterized as a logistics node, the aircraft carrier can provide outstanding logistical support for both maritime and land forces. Although bulk resupply is naturally limited, the trend towards smaller, direct logistic packages makes the aircraft carrier a useful platform to both conduct and coordinate JTF logistical efforts.

Finally, enhanced unity of command and unity of effort will allow the JFC to break down stovepipes that separate JTF forces and ensure operational success for the JTF commander. Greater unity of command and unity of effort are achieved in parallel by locating the JFC and component commanders on the same platform. In particular, this allows the JTF time to resolve differences and develop a "battle rhythm"[55] during the movement phase. This bonding strengthens their relationship upon arrival in theater. As the JTF commander's headquarters of choice, the carrier embodies the CJCS's vision of future

warfighting as reflected in his four operational pillars of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full- dimensional protection, and focused logistics.

VIII. Meeting the Challenge

The success of the operational commander in 2010 will ultimately depend on the union of two revolutions -- military affairs and joint doctrine. The capabilities of future warfighting initiatives collectively grouped under the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) title must include, up front, an equally revolutionary joint doctrine. As one author stated,

> To fully realize the revolutionary potential of new technology we must develop doctrine that incorporates innovative operational concepts as well as organizational concepts that are joint, deployable, and informationally smart.[56]

A brief historical reflection highlights how some of the more notable RMA successes depended on equally effective doctrine. Interlocking fires unleashed the machine gun's deadly potential. Operational maneuver proved the value of the tank against interior lines. Even the aircraft carrier's future hinged on the effective employment of air power against a battleship. Today, faced with the swirling frenzy of hardware innovations, the military needs a divining doctrine to give shape to substance. This is perhaps the greatest benefit of the CINC's standing joint task forces. They are the stewards and the authors of the revolutionary joint doctrine. From headquarters, to exercises, to deployment, they are responsible for the development, critique, and codification of future joint doctrine. Their efforts will narrow the wide chasm that separates joint doctrine and today's forces. This gap may never fully close, but the SJTF staff's efforts will ensure a continuous linkage between joint doctrine and RMA innovations of tomorrow. Of course, such a move requires a degree of compromise. It might

sound naive, but at some point the needs of the operational commander must outweigh service parochialism and the unending fight for service resources (arguably a service chief's number one mission). As a military,

> We must move beyond the histrionics of today and think in terms of the doctrine that JFCs will really need in the future. Budget battles generally affect each service in the mid to short term. But how joint doctrine is designed has consequences for conducting operations, directly translating into indeterminate costs of time, resources, and lives.[57]

Some may question the need to change the present system. After all, despite its inefficiencies, none of them represent show stoppers. Military units still manage to execute their daily missions throughout the world. This paper is not advocating an immediate scrapping of the present system. In fact, it is our well-founded, time-proven Service warfighting doctrine that will protect our flanks as we build toward 2010. However, at risk in the present debate is the effectiveness of future military operations. The reality is that staying the course will only exacerbate the lag of doctrine to technology, as the pace of the RMA continues unabated.[58]

IX. Conclusion

Joint warfare is future warfare. There will be few, if any, future operations that are not joint in some way. The Services urgently need to adopt a like-minded recognition of the future threat and acknowledgment of the best capabilities to defeat it. The continued resistance to JV 2010's command and control guidance at the operational level may result in devastating repercussions. Any delay in taking the "leap of faith" into true joint command and control, through the establishment and deployment of standing JTFs, makes the U.S.

military vulnerable to not only a future peer competitor, but also to Congressional intervention. A disappointed Congress may even raise the phoenix of Goldwater-Nichols, circa 1986, and legislate an intrusive form of jointness.

The changes advocated in this paper are only possible through a top-down approach: the unswerving commitment by the Secretary of Defense, in unison with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to force the services to follow the prescription outlined in JV 2010. In the end it means anticipating, not reacting, to change. It is all about riding the bow wave, rather than being dragged down by the undertow.

X. Postscript

2010 - On board USS COLIN POWELL (CVJ 86), inport Norfolk, Virginia.

At first glance, older sailors thought the newly reporting Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) staff members might be members of an aviation fuels inspection team. Their distinctly purple turtlenecks contrasted with their "Underway Green" coveralls made them resemble the JP-5 fuels teams of the late 20th century shipboard engineering and aviation departments. These 21st century "Grapes," as they affectionately are known, represent the new vintage "sailors." In fact, many are not sailors at all. Instead, this bunch are members of the CINC's standing JEF staff. All services -- Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines -- make up this unique blend of professionals. Even the Coast Guard and State Department are represented! The changing international environment and the loss of key overseas bases accelerated this landmark decision. What would have been laughingly dismissed 20 years earlier is now occurring throughout all the aircraft carriers of the U.S. Navy.

Endnotes

[1] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 (Washington D.C.: n.d.), 29.

[2] George A. Joulwan, "Doctrine for Combined Operations," Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, 48.

[3] Thomas-Durell Young, "Top Down Planning and Joint Doctrine: The Australian Experience," Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1996, 66. This article provides insight to Australia's "Top Down" approach in their joint doctrine and offers an assessment of U.S. joint doctrine development.

[4] Frank Boyington, Staff member of U.S. Marine Corps Standing Joint Task Force, telephone conversation, 22 JAN 98. His offered his explanation of why the JCSE works so well under direct control of JCS.

[5] Ronald R. Fogleman, "The Air Force and Joint Vision 2010," Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, 26.

[6] "Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory Urban Warrior Experimental Framework," Draft 1-2, (Unpublished Concept Paper, United States Marine Corps Development Command: 29 November 1997), 22.

[7] Joseph J. Redden, "Joint Doctrine, The Way Ahead," Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, 11.

[8] Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Interservice Competition: The Solution not the Problem," Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1997, 50. This article offers a completely different opinion on the subject, and the lack of Congressional interest in greater jointness.

[9] William A. Owens, "The Emerging System of Systems," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1995, 38.

[10] Jay L. Johnson, "The Navy in 2010: A Joint Vision," Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, 19.

[11] T.J. McKearney, "CNEF Arriving!" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1996, 36-40; DDL OMNI Engineering LLC brief to COMTHIRDFLT, 11 December 1997, "Initial Technical Briefing (ITB) of Revision of NWP 3-56, Composite Warfare Commander's Manual," USS CORONADO (AGF 11), San Diego; "Naval Expeditionary Task Force Command and Control," (Unpublished Navy Pub, Naval Doctrine Command: 01 July 1996); "The Evolution of the Naval Expeditionary Task Force," (Unpublished Briefing Slides, Naval Doctrine Command: n.d). These works all provide excellent background on the NETF concept, a unique version of it in CNEF, and a view of where the Navy is going for the foreseeable future in terms of incorporating joint doctrine– the Navy is pursuing only an update to the CWC manual. The completed work will not provide the ability to execute seamless joint lash-ups.

[12] Chief of Naval Operations //N3/N5//, "Command Relations for Naval Forces," Naval Message DTG 261739Z September 1997, 2.

[13] Charles C. Krulak, "Doctrine for Joint Force Integration," Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, 20-23. This work provides the Commandant's perspective on whether to form JTFs along functional or service lines.

[14] Redden, 11.

[15] Dennis J. Reimer and Ronald R. Fogleman, "Joint Warfare and the Army-Air Force Team," Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1996, 14.

[16] Ibid., 15.

[17] Douglas Lovelace and Thomas-Durell Young, "Joint Doctrine Development: Overcoming a Legacy." Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, 97.

[18] Charles C. Krulak, "Commandant's Planning Guidance," Marine Corps Gazette, August 1995, A-5.

[19] J.T. McKearney, "CNEF, We Hardly Knew Ye," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January, 1998, 10. In this work the author alludes to such an ultimate goal in response to the Navy-Marine Corps decision to cancel NETF (Naval Expeditionary Task Force).

[20] Boyington, 22 January 1998.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Lovelace and Young, 97.

[23] Robert Chelberg and others, "EUCOM - At the Center of the Vortex," Field Artillery, October 1993, 14.

[24] Ibid., 12-16; Jay B. Yakely III and Harold E. Bullock, "Training the Pacific Warriors," Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1996, p. 16-21. These articles outline two of the more successful *hybrid ad hoc* programs.

[25] Ibid. This list is composed of sections of the two articles listed above.

[26] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), (Joint Pub 0-2) (Washington D.C.: 24 February 1995), IV-2.

[27] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Procedures for Forming and Operating a Joint Task Force (Preliminary Coordination Draft) (Joint Pub 5-00.2) (Washington, D.C.: 19 March 1996), II-1.

[28] Krulak, "Doctrine for Joint Force Integration," 23.

[29] U.S. Air Force, "Global Engagement: Air and Space Power Organization and Employment," Air Force Doctrine Document 2 - Version 7, Draft, 10 October 1997, 23.

[30] George T. Raach and Ilana Kass, "National Power and the Interagency Process," Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1995, 13.

[31] William A. Owens, "Naval Voyage to an Uncharted World," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December, 1994, 32.

[32] Chelberg, 13-14.

[33] "Nations/Armed Forces/Order of Battle/USA/Navy/Training Institutions," U.S. Naval Institute Periscope Database, Rockville, MD: United Communications Group, March 1995. This source lists Officer force levels as (1997 estimated): U.S. Navy = 56,100; U.S. Marine Corps = 17,978; U.S. Air Force = 74,445; U.S. Army = 80,300.

[34] Ronald Mayer, Joint Warfighting Center, telephone conversation with author, 20 January 1998. Author discussed possibly one SJTF covers only some TBD lower end of MOOTW operation, while another SJTF covers the upper end, while another covers all non-MOOTW.

[35] Ibid.,; Mayer, "Narrative to the Concept for Future Joint Operations," (Unpublished Concept Paper, Joint Warfighting Center: May 1997). Particularly helpful sections of this work are those entitled: (1) The Joint

Reorganization Act of 2005; (2) The DoD Information Net; and (3) Planning: October through December 2009.

[36] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Concept for Future Joint Operations, Expanding Joint Vision 2010 (Washington D.C.: May 1997), 79.

[37] Mayer, telephone. Ron Mayer coined the "virtual staff" phrase to describe the many agencies, institutions, and individuals whose expertise could be available to the JTF staff through a computer communication network.

[38] Ronald R. Fogleman, "The Air Force and Joint Vision 2010," Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, 26.

[39] Ralph L. Tindal, "The Joint Task Force Commander Afloat: Doctrinal Challenges," (Unpublished Research Paper, U. S. Naval War College, Newport, R. I., 1997), 2. This work offers good insight into the benefits and weaknesses of a JTF headquarters at sea, plus the shortcomings in joint doctrine.

[40] Ibid., 10.

[41] Ibid., 11.

[42] U.S. Air Force, "Global Engagement," 22.

[43] Bernard Perez, ed., The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World 1995, Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 893 and 908. The four flagships, their fleet, and the year they entered service are as follows: USS MOUNT WHITNEY (LCC 20, 2nd Fleet, 1971); USS CORONADO (AGF 11, 3rd Fleet, 1970); USS LA SALLE (AGF 3, 6th Fleet, 1964); and USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC 19, 7th Fleet, 1970) .

[44] Tindal, 5.

[45] JV 2010, 1.

[46] Ibid., 20.

[47] Johnson, "The Navy in 2010," 18. Although the author speaks in terms of all Naval forces, this quote is most related to the aircraft carrier as the nucleus of the carrier battlegroup.

[48] JV 2010, 21.

[49] Yakely, 20. There is undoubtedly a need for both deploying and non-deploying elements of the SJTF staff. However, rather than just deploying a core, keep a full staff deployed, while the core stays back at headquarters. In addition to being a surge force, the core acts as a conduit for the "virtual staffs." Both staffs spend a large amount of time validating and incorporating JTFs into the CINC's OPLANS, conducting exercises and exercise planning, as well as ongoing crisis and deliberate planning.

[50] Chelberg, 14.

[51] JV 2010, 22.

[52] Tindal, 7.

[53] U.S. Air Force, "Global Engagement," 24.

[54] JV 2010, 24.

[55] Tindal, 7.

[56] James Morningstar, "Technologies, Doctrine, and Organization for RMA," Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1997, 37.

[57] Wells, Gordon M. "Deep Operations, Command and Control, and Joint Doctrine: Time for a Change." Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, 103.

[58] Owens, "System of Systems," 39. In the work the author cautions, "If we decide to accelerate the transition we can complete it early in the next century: if we continue to let things evolve at their present pace, we will not complete it until sometime in the second decade of the 21st century."

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